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This chapter delves into the nature of the pactum as both substantial and functional bond as well as 
mythical canon of any contractual-constituting initiative in the public and private spheres. The aim is 
to show that the movement toward the conceptualisation of good faith as an organising principle and 
implied term in the Common law tradition is due to the need to counterbalance our inhuman condition 
as made it manifest by the humanitarian façade of the modern constitutional project. This claim is 
supported by an unconventional method of investigation that will promote the comparison between the 
role of political action at the public level and the increasing utilisation of the doctrine of good faith in 
Contract law theory and practice. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The idea to embark upon the editing of this book was born from the writing of a paper whose aim was 
to address the reasons and extent to which, within the area of specific performance, the development of 
the law of contract is currently influenced by constitutional values and Fundamental Rights issues in 
South Africa, the UK, and Australia.1 On that occasion, particular attention was dedicated to analysis 
of how and why the common trend towards good faith and contractual fairness in these jurisdictions is 
characterised by a clear divergence of positivistic methodologies. In light of that study and its outcomes, 
other chapters deal with the interplay of Fundamental Rights and Constitutional/Contract law on a 
comparative basis to provide the reader with other compelling accounts of several core components of 
the contractarian dimension. 
The appearance of the present contribution at the end of this collection of essays is due not only 
to its length, but also to its essence, which is far less positivistic and more philosophical2 than that of 
the pieces that precede it. The intent is indeed to offer a general theoretical framework to contextualise 
further the constitutionalisation of Contract law from a broader perspective of inquiry. This will be done 
by addressing what the pactum, as both substantial and functional bond and mythical canon of any 
contractual-constituting initiative, is currently experiencing in the West at the private and public levels. 
Supiot is of the opinion that the Westernisation of living standards is informed by the liberal 
ideology of ‘contractualism’, that is, by ‘the idea that the contractual bond is the ultimate form of social 
bond and is destined to replace the unilateral imperatives of the law everywhere’.3 Rather than being 
something to favour, Supiot maintains that the West’s belief in contractualism ought to be challenged, 
as it drains the law’s anthropological function by ‘conceiv[ing] of society as a sum of individuals 
motivated by self-interested calculation’.4 The reason for this is, Supiot notes, the instrumentalist role 
assumed by ‘the law of contract . . . [in] market operations’.5  
Importantly, Supiot further distinguishes the ideology of contractualism from its material 
counterpart, which he defines as the ‘process of contractualisation’, and which is aimed at extending all 
those ‘contractual techniques’ that are in line with the liberal conception of societal relations and the 
West’s aspiration for global, systematic unity. The role that Supiot assigns to contractualism in the 
                                                          
1 Siliquini-Cinelli and Hutchison (2016). 
2 On the importance of having a philosophical approach to comparative law, see Ewald (1995). See also Samuel 
(1998). 
3 Supiot (2007), p. 83. 
4 Ibid., p. 84. See also Collins (1999), pp. 128–147. 
5 Supiot (2007), p. 85. 
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‘blurring of the distinction between public and private’6 appears to be consistent with Cotterrell’s notion 
of ‘legal ideology of contract’. According to Cotterrell, the ideology of contract is indeed made up of 
two different elements: one referring to the humanising fiction perpetrated through contracts, the other 
to the pervasiveness of contractual relationships and the relevance of their repercussions for society at 
large. More specifically, with respect to the former component, Cotterrell specifies that ‘[t]he 
ideological significance of legal contract form lies in the idea of legal equivalence, the exact legal 
balancing of reciprocal rights and obligations of formally equal contracting parties assumed to be acting 
freely’.7  However, Cotterrell notes, ‘[i]n this way the law systematically interprets actual relations and 
conditions of inequality and substantial unfreedom as relations of equality and free choice, and attaches 
legal consequences accordingly’.8 The second element is, instead, that of universality in the sense that 
this ideology performs its instances in everyday life because it is capable ‘of being applied [also] to . . 
. relations not directly concerned with economic production.’9 Through this double-featured structure 
and force, ‘[t]he pervasive legal ideology of contract . . . promotes the breakdown of all major status 
differentials unconnected with the needs of an economy based on market exchanges and confirms and 
defines the particular form of individualism in them of which capitalist social relations are 
conceptualised.’10 
What is of significance for our purposes is that, once combined, Supiot’s and Cotterrell’s 
accounts of what contractualism and the contractualisation of human existence entail is in line with the 
well-known notion of homo oeconomicus, that is, of a subject who does not act freely in determining 
who she is as a person, but merely behaves according to reason-oriented inputs.11 The paradigm of homo 
oeconomicus is in this sense the protagonist of a form of society underpinned by inter-subjectivity 
without subjects. This self-dissolving essence of homo oeconomicus is due to the fact that reason is 
common to of all us, and thus, as Kahn has pointed out, ‘is not self-defining’.12 When we pursue our 
own interest, that is, when we let our attitude be determined by the outcome of a rational calculation 
(Heidegger would call it the ‘calculating self-adjustment of ratio’13), we do not actively decide for and 
against something or someone but merely dwell in what we should perhaps define as a procedural—as 
opposed to absolute—truth. Consequently, to speak of ‘rational action’ is nothing but an oxymoron: 
action is as never rational, nor predictable, as behaviour is. This explains why the civilising mission of 
contract14 has played a pivotal role in the formation of our post-historical and post-political condition 
                                                          
6 Supiot (2007), p. 106. 
7 Cotterrell (2008), p. 175. (Emphasis in original). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., p. 176. 
10 Ibid. 
11 My approach to homo oeconomicus is purely philosophical. Given how often the term ‘self-determination’ is 
used to describe this form of conduct, it is expected that some commentators would not share this view. See 
Schütte, in this book; Siliquini-Cinelli (2015a). 
12 Kahn (2008), p. 175.  
13 Heidegger (1998), p. 50. 
14 Supiot (2007), pp. 79–86. 
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by displacing the self-affirming properties of action. As such, it has also revealed the illusory character 
of modern social contract theory and the modern constitutional ideal as we are accustomed to consider 
them. 
To understand this fully, attention should be paid to the opposed condition that the humanising 
(that is, self-defining, historical, and political) deditio in fidem expressed in and performed through the 
pact is assuming in the constitutional (public) and contract (private) spheres in Western jurisdictions. 
The need to conduct such an analysis is related to (1) the move of Western civilisation towards a global 
model of society underpinned by the notions of ‘civilised economy’ and ‘good economic governance’;15 
(2) the increased reference to the doctrine of good faith in Common 16  law jurisdictions, which 
notwithstanding their emphasis on the pursuit of self-interest, has reached an unprecedented extension, 
as is made evident with the recent Canadian and Irish cases of Bhasin v. Hrynew and Flynn v. Breccia.17 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 will engage with the former trend in light of the 
modern constitutional project as epitomised by Hobbes’ social contract theory. Section 3 will prepare 
the ground for the neorealist contextualisation of the latter phenomenon by reflecting on Comparative 
                                                          
15 Both terms refer to the belief that governments should educate consumers and build or reform institutions to 
regulate economic activities according to rational global standards determined by outsiders. See Siliquini-Cinelli 
(2015a, 2015b). 
16 I use capital ‘C’ to refer to the Common law as a legal tradition. Common (with an uppercase c) law and 
common law are two different things: while the former is a legal tradition marked by a number of particular 
characteristics, the latter refers to only a part of the Common law (and includes elements of both case law and 
Customary law). 
17 [2014] SCC 71 (Supreme Court of Canada) and [2015] IEHC 547 (Irish High Court) respectively. The growing 
relevance of good faith in the Common law tradition may also be witnessed in the (not linear and at time 
inconsistent) developments of the subject in England, Australia, New Zealand, and Scotland (a mixed legal 
jurisdiction). Cf. Lymington Marina Ltd v MacNamara [2007] Bus LR Digest D29 (England and Wales Court of 
Appeal (Civil)); Socimer International Bank Ltd v Standard Bank London Ltd, [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 558 (England 
and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil)); Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd, [2013] EWHC 111 
QB (England and Wales High Court (Queen’s Bench)); North East Solutions Pty Ltd v Masters Home 
Improvement Australia Pty Ltd [2016] VSC 1 (Supreme Court of Victoria); Pacioccio v Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Limited, [2015] FCAFC 50 (Federal Court of Australia); Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron 
Pty Ltd, (No 6) [2015] FCA 825 (Federal Court of Australia); Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker [2014] 
HCA 32 (High Court of Australia); Bobux Marketing Ltd v Raynor Marketing Ltd, [2002] 1 NZLR 506 (Court of 
Appeal of New Zealand); Smith v Bank of Scotland, [1997] SC (HL) 111 (House of Lords). 
It seems that the courts shared Martijn W. Hesselink’s conviction that ‘common law lawyers should not fear the 
concept of good faith.’ See Hesselink (2010), p. 648. Contra, arguing that good faith in the performance of 
contracts ‘is not a concept foreign to the common law’, see Allsop JC’s remarks in United Group Rail Services 
Ltd v Rail Corporation New South Wales, [2009] NSWCA 177, para 634 [58] (New South Wales Court of Appeal), 
and in Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited, cited above, para 287. To be compared to 
Bingham LJ’s statements in Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v StilettoVisual Programmes Ltd [1989] QB 433, paras 
439 and 445. See also Rowly and Rawlings (2005), p. 83. See also below, note 141. See also Carter (2012), p. 22. 
Given the scope of this contribution, in the following pages I will not deal with the content of these judgements, 
nor with their analytical repercussions. Suffice to say that in Bashin, before awarding to good faith the status of 
an organising principle ‘in order to make the common law less unsettled and piecemeal, more coherent and more 
just’ (at [33]), Cromwell J discussed the US scenario and endeavoured in a comparative enterprise among 
Common law jurisdictions to point out how, from the UK to the Australia, the doctrine of good faith has become 
increasingly important in recent years. Yet it would be prudent to set the US apart from comparable cases because 
of its well-known ‘exceptionalism’, which in contract law assumes the form of the peculiar relationship between 
the Anglo component of its legal system as a whole and a code (the Uniform Commercial Code) in which, along 
with the doctrine of fair dealing, the duty to act in good faith is normativised. For a compelling account on the 
role that good faith and bad faith play in American Public law, see Pozen (2016). 
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law’s status and methodologies of inquiry at the time of writing. Section 4 will then move on to 
comparing the humanising, active role that good faith plays in Contract law theory and practice with 
Hobbes’ juridical-institutional model of society. Concluding remarks will follow. 
 
 
2 The Pactum at the Public Level 
 
Authority and sovereignty disappeared in the West long ago, when power absorbed them both. As I 
have been claiming for some time now, the substitution of authority and sovereignty with power has 
occurred alongside the absorption of the (self-defining, historical and political) negativity of action and 
experience by the (self-dissolving, post-historical and post-political) positivity of behaviour and 
knowledge.  
The effects of this artifice have become particularly noticeable since the fall of the ‘bipolar’ system. 
Several data suggest indeed that what the Western paradigm of global civilisation has been undergoing 
since the end of the ‘bipolar’ age is a two-pronged trend. At the public level, the sovereign and 
authoritarian character of the pacta sunt servanda doctrine appears to have been increasingly weakened 
by the force through which soft-networked mechanisms of managerial post-national governance 
displace the irreducibility of foundation that characterises both political action18 and any constituting 
initiative. The shift from ‘input’ (negative) to ‘output’ (positive) forms of legitimation and 
accountability in which post-national governance’s liquid working logic is rooted may be used to 
support this argument. The same may be said with respect to the fact that constitutionalism is said to 
have become conceptually transnational,19 or that public autonomy has ceased to be relevant,20 and that 
the basic conceptual configurations of the kinopolitical paradigm of our time (i.e., movement) have no 
origin.21 If we are all ‘migrants’ rather than ‘citizens’, it might be noted, it is because the functioning of 
flows, junctions, circulations, circuits, and recirculations drains the constitutive properties of political 
action by giving priority to the dynamism that keeps our post-historical and post-political condition 
alive.  
Similarly, the fast-developing spread of fluid schemes of global governance seems to indicate 
that our current inhuman condition is due to what Agamben has defined as the ‘complete confusion’ 
                                                          
18 It should be clarified at this early stage that, contrary to Arendt, I conceive of the ‘will’ as a vital component of 
political action. See Siliquini-Cinelli (2015b).  
19 Zumbansen (2012); Goderis and Versteeg (2015). See sections 3 and 4, below.  
Arendt’s insight into the vanishing of (legal and political) authority may be of assistance here. In her words, the 
loss of authority ‘is tantamount to the loss of the groundwork of the world, which indeed . . . has begun to shift, 
to change and transform itself with ever-increasing rapidity from one shape into another. . . ’. See Arendt (2006), 
p. 95.  See also ibid. p. 91, and (2006), pp. 171–206. Yet some commentators might contend that this depends on 
how the transposition of constitutions to external arenas is historically interpreted. See Frankenberg (2012).  
20 Somek (2012), p. 58. 
21 Nail (2015), pp. 21–38. 
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between ‘juridification and commodification of human relations’.22 Therefore it seems difficult to 
dispute that, as Negri has summarised, ‘[t]he passage from government to governance infringes [upon] 
the unitary regulation of the systems of public law’.23 
On the contrary, I submit, the notion of contractual good faith as an organising principle or 
implied duty is increasingly (and perhaps unconsciously) used within the Private law dimension as a 
tool to counter-balance this dehumanising phenomenon.24 An inquiry into the intensification of the use 
of the doctrine of good faith in Common law countries—that is, in jurisdictions whose Contract law is 
underpinned by the behavioural logic of consideration—from a post-humanist25 perspective would 
prove that, at least to a certain extent, contracts are being used as an instrument of government rather 
than governance.26 
The contract’s paradoxical development may not only serve either to confirm or question the 
above suggestions on the status of the public sphere, but may also shed new light on what unites the 
demise of law’s anthropological and sociopolitical functions with the essence of our dehumanised 
condition, as well as with the use of biopolitics as its signature.27 This in turn depends on our ability 
and willingness to interpret correctly what the pactum has been experiencing in both public and private 
dimensions. For my own part, I believe that the starting point of such an intellectual endeavour should 
be Arendt’s account of the Hobbesian strategy to preserve the bourgeois’ economic interests and 
imperialist expansion.  In particular, according to Arendt, the artificial birth of the Leviathan was based 
‘not on some kind of constituting law . . . which determines the rights and wrongs of the individual’s 
interest with respect to public affairs, but on the individual interests themselves.’28 This is so because 
‘[p]ower, according to Hobbes, is the accumulated control that permits the individual to fix prices and 
regulate supply and demand in such a way that they contribute to his own advantage’.29 
Arendt’s claim is lent considerable support by Weiss and Hobson’s exemplary study on the 
symbiosis between modern state formation and economics,30 Gellner’s historical reconstruction of the 
rise of economic nationalism between the sixteenth and eighteen centuries,31 Thornhill’s contention that 
in many cases statehood depends on transnationalism, and O’Donoghue’s description of 
                                                          
22 Agamben (2012), p. 40. To be compared to the notion of ‘mercatocracy’ used by Cutler (2003). 
23 Negri (2010), p. 217. 
24 Supiot (2007), pp. 83 and 103, correctly links the ‘weakening of the State’ brought about by the processes of 
‘(re-)territorialization’ to the ideology of ‘contractualism’.  
25 The label ‘post-humanist’ refers to the need to protect and promote human values and Fundamental Rights 
through politics and justice whilst at the same time neutralising humanism’s secular exclusions. The increase in 
inequality brought about by the (allegedly civilising) globalisation of trade is testament to this. See Rosanvallon 
(2013); Siliquini-Cinelli (2015b). 
26 Zumbansen (2007). 
27 Siliquini-Cinelli (2015a). 
28 Arendt (1973), p. 139. See also Arendt (2005), pp. 98–99. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Weiss and Hobson (1995); 
31 Gellner (1983). 
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constitutionalism as an instrument of ‘governance’ rather than ‘government’. 32  The revolutionary 
lucidity of Arendt’s argument may therefore help us uncover the limits of classic approaches to the 
modern constitutional process, and thus uncover the relationship between the double-featured condition 
undergone by the contract at the time of writing. 
Martin Loughlin’s scholarship on Hobbes and sovereignty may serve as an example. In one of 
his major works, The Idea of Public Law, Loughlin has defined sovereignty not only as ‘the foundational 
concept underpinning public law [which] stands as a representation of the autonomy of the political’, 
but also as ‘a function of the institutional arrangements established as a consequence of the formation 
of the modern state’.33 The conceptualisation of ‘the people’ as a collective political actor is then rooted 
in the foundation of the sovereign state and idea that public power acquires an ontologically autonomous 
status. 34  Thus, to Loughlin, sovereignty is a never-ending politico-relational enterprise between 
constituted and constituent powers. In promoting this regulatory view, Loughlin also explained why, 
being autonomous, political power cannot be encapsulated within a specific place once and for all, but 
must be let free to circulate and express itself in every political relationship.35  
I agree with Tierney that Loughlin’s account ‘helps us to bypass two caricatures prominent 
within public law scholarship’ in the UK, namely the ‘law as politics’ and the ‘pure theory of positive 
law’.36  More precisely, I share Loughlin’s belief in the importance of distinguishing between the 
political conception of sovereignty from its institutional configuration—a view that recalls the politico-
theological distinction between creatio and conservatio, and in particular Erich Peterson’s 1935 
separation between kingdom and government.37 However, Loughlin’s contention that as long as ‘novel 
institutional arrangements’ do not affect ‘the question of “ultimate” authority’, sovereignty is preserve38 
does not help us appreciate that the substitution of political government with administrative governance 
occurred along the path initiated by power’s absorption of authority and sovereignty. 
Similarly, Loughlin’s account of the Hobbesian contractarian model of sovereignty falls short 
of offering us the tools that we need to understand the unofficial essence of the nation-state’s building 
process in its entirety. I refer particularly here to Loughlin’s suggestion that Hobbes’ social contract 
theory is ‘a purely juristic account of the state’.39 This is a view that is entirely different from Arendt’s 
argument that ‘Hobbes’ picture of man defeats his purpose of providing the basis of a Commonwealth 
                                                          
32 O’Donoghue (2014). 
33 Loughlin (2003), pp. 93 and 80, respectively. 
34 Ibid. p. 78. From this it inevitably follows that the concept of constitutional pluralism is an oxymoron. See 
Loughlin (2014). 
35 Ibid., p. 83. 
36 Tierney (2008), p. 15. 
37 Agamben (2011). 
38 Loughlin (2003), p. 95; Loughlin (2008), pp. 56–59. Similar suggestions are made by many. Others argue 
instead for the possibility of relativising the concept of legitimacy/authority itself. See van der Vossen (2011); 
Roughan (2011). See also the (2013) 4(3) Issue of Transnational Legal Theory. 
39 Loughlin, (2015), p. 6. See also Loughlin (2012), p. 282: ‘The modern constitution is . . . conceived by Hobbes 
to be a contract entered into by the people to establish a comprehensive framework through which the institutions 
of government are established and the exercise of their powers regulated’. 
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and gives instead a consistent pattern of attitudes through which every genuine community can easily 
be destroyed’.40 
Hence, I would rather suggest that we commence our attempt to ascertain the condition of the 
pactum at the public level with Arendt’s and Agamben’s shared interest in what the constitution and 
development of the nation-state has revealed about the subjects of biopolitics. Notwithstanding the 
different trajectories of their thoughts, 41  the common denominator in Arendt’s and Agamben’s 
scholarship is indeed that no rights can be guaranteed to those who are deprived of membership in a 
political community.  
Agamben famously argued that the politico-juridical figure of the Western tradition is that of 
homo sacer, that is, of a man who cannot be officially killed, and yet, should such a killing occur, no 
one would be held responsible. This figure has emerged through the formation of a zone of indistinction 
between bare life (zoē) and political existence (bios), mentioned earlier. Hence, contra Foucault, 
Agamben showed that the biopolitical violence that humans experience daily, and that reached its 
culmination with the Nazi death camp, had its inception long before modernity, at the point when the 
regulative apparatus of the oikonomia first emerged;42 rather, the modern nation-state has merely placed 
biopolitics ‘at the centre’ of its own ‘calculations’ by using the declaration of rights as a way to blur the 
distinction between bare life and its political counterpart. More particularly, ‘[d]eclarations of rights 
represent the originary figure of the inscription of [the] natural into the juridico-political order of the 
nation-state’.43 
What matters for the scope of our discussion is that Agamben assigned to the formation of 
bourgeois democracy and the voiding of the distinction between public and private a key role in this 
process. Similarly, Arendt referred to the intrusion of the bourgeois’ emancipation into the realm of the 
political to point out that Hobbes’ cruel artifice stands in clear opposition to the notions of political 
freedom and political community out of which, we are told, the modern constitutional initiative arose.44 
The reason for this is that both concepts depend on ‘the company of other men who [are] in the same 
state, and . . . [need] a common public space to meet them—a politically organised world . . . into which 
each of the free men could insert himself by word and deed’.45 Conversely, ‘[w]here men live together 
but do not form a body politic’, this peculiar form of freedom does not manifest itself: ‘[w]ithout a 
politically guaranteed public realm, freedom lacks the worldly space to make its appearance’.46 For the 
constitution of a body politic to occur, the subjects must have the capacity to enjoy political freedom 
through deed and action; that is, they must have the political ‘capacity to act’, as Barbour has rightly 
                                                          
40 Arendt (1973), p. 140. On this point, see also Franz Borkenau’s scholarship on Hobbes. 
41 Agamben (2016), p. 23. For an introduction, see Liska (2013). 
42 Agamben (2011); see also Agamben (2007); Agamben (2012); Agamben (2013); Agamben (2015). 
43 Agamben (1998), pp. 6 and 127. See also ibid. p. 121; Agamben (2016), p. 263, where Agamben seems to 
contradict himself on the use of the terms ‘natural’ and ‘bare’ life. 
44 Arendt (1998), p. 68. 
45 Arendt (2006), p. 147. 
46 Ibid. See also ibid. p. 153 
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noted. 47  This definition of the body politic is clearly related to what Arendt argued about the 
disappearance of the ‘private/public’ sphere divide as brought about by the socialisation of humankind’s 
existence. 48  In particular, Arendt’s conceptualisation of political freedom and the role that the 
spontaneity of political action plays in its formation and protection can be overlapped with her 
metaphorical description of the public realm as a ‘table’ that prevents the ‘people gathered around’ from 
‘falling over each other’.49  
If Agamben’s biopolitical reconstruction and Arendt’s contentions about the rise of society, 
nature of the body politic, and Hobbes’ instrumentalist strategy are correct, it would mean that, in his 
fight against the fear of death (homo homini lupus), Hobbes aimed at more than simply securing the 
stability and peace humans need for self-preservation. More particularly, Arendt’s claims lead one to 
think that the nation-state is perhaps the West’s greatest paradox of the last three centuries: the same 
(exceptional, as Schmitt would say) sovereign contractual-constitutionalising process of pure, 
immediate, and simultaneous ‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’ 50  that led to the essential positivistic 
formation of the modern form of polity, and whose humanitarian façade was aimed at guaranteeing our 
existential political freedom through the safety of the newly formed community (homo homini deus), is 
best understood as a politico-juridical fiction put forward for speculative reasons. 
The influence that Stoic universalism has had on the development of Western tradition and 
formation of the modern nation-state51 further confirms that what we are dealing with is but a process 
that commenced long ago. From this it follows that Hobbes’ illusory device leaves us with an 
interrogative of the first order regarding our inhuman condition: whether the modern form of politico-
national community into which we think we were born—and whose signification, we argue, has been 
transcended by its ‘post-’ variant52—ever actually existed. More than fifty years ago, MacPherson 
insisted that it did not. More precisely, while explaining why ‘the seventeenth-century concepts of 
freedom, rights, obligation, and justice are all [shaped] by [the] concept of possession’, MacPherson 
argued that Hobbes wanted to establish a ‘possessive market society’, and demonstrated that for 
                                                          
47 Barbour (2013), p. 307. (Emphasis added). 
48 Arendt (1998), pp. 28 and 46 
49 Arendt (1998), p. 53. See also Agamben (2005), pp. 95 and 106. 
The table metaphor recalls Heidegger’s (otherwise very different) scholarship on the role of ‘nearness’ in every 
act of ‘ek-sistence’. In Heidegger’s words, ‘the human being, existing as a transcendence that exceeds in the 
direction of possibilities, is a creature of distance’. See Heidegger (1998), p. 135. 
50 Agamben (1998), pp. 44–48 
51 Cassirer (1946), pp. 163–75. 
52 The founding of dedicated law journals and book series, as well as the launch of new undergraduate and 
postgraduate courses in transnational and global law worldwide, are testament to this subject’s increasing 
relevance within legal discourse. For present purposes, in addition to Teubner’s scholarship on post-national 
societal constitutionalism, see Twining (2009); Kuo (2010); Handl, Zekoll, and Zumbansen (2012); Dobner and 
Loughlin (2012); Walker (2012); Krisch (2012); Amhlaigh, Michelon, and Walker (2013); Zumbansen (2013); 
Helfand (2015). See also the (2008) 6(3)–(4) Special Issues of the International Journal of Constitutional Law on 
the symposium ‘Constitutionalism in an Era of Globalization and Privatization’, and the interview with Canada’s 
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in the New York Times, in which Canada is defined as the ‘first post-national state’, 
Available at: http://www.nytimes.come/2015/12/13/magazine/trudeaus-canada-again.html?_r=0 Accessed 15 
February 2016. 
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Hobbes, the state of nature is already a community of ‘civilised’ people. From a sociological 
perspective, ‘[Hobbes’] state of nature is a statement of the behaviour to which men as they now are, 
men who live in civilized societies and have the desires of civilized men, would be led if all law and 
contract enforcement . . . were removed’. Thus ‘[t]he state of nature is a deduction from the appetites 
and other faculties not of man as such but of civilized men’.53 
Yet it could be objected that MacPherson’s argument is not of great assistance to us, as it is 
well known that the Hobbesian state of nature has never been a real epoch in historical terms but merely 
represents ‘a principle internal to the City’.54 The point, however, is that Hobbes fictionally referred to 
an ahistorical, and thus inhuman, model of society to elaborate on a concept of sovereign power and 
body politic that equally rejected what makes us human. Thus Arendt claimed that Hobbes’ political 
roadmap ‘exclu[ded] in principle . . . the idea of humanity’.55 For different reasons and through different 
patterns of inquiry, Agamben too uncovered the illusory humanitarian character of the nation-state by 
identifying a link between its secular functioning and the administrative apparatus of the Church: 
considering that ‘theology [has] resolv[ed] itself into atheism’ because of the administrative regulative 
model prompted by the Church, ‘[m]odernity, removing God from the world, has not only failed to 
leave theology behind, but in some ways has done nothing other than to lead the project of the 
providential oikonomia to completion’.56 If that is the case, then the fact that ‘popular sovereignty [is] 
by now an expression drained of all meaning’57 comes as no surprise: it is the inevitable outcome 
prompted by the working logic of the Western politico-juridical conception according to which human 
existence and interaction ought to be managerially administered rather than politically governed. 
A neorealist58 comparison between the contractarian and allegedly humanitarian narrative of 
the rise of the Leviathan and the biopolitical essence of the nation-state shows, then, that the proposed 
distinction between modernity and what came after it – namely our global, transnational age – is 
misleading.  
 
 
3 On Comparative Law and Its Method(s): Knowledge vs Experience 
 
Before going any farther with our inquiry, a methodological clarification is in order. Some 
commentators would indeed deem the aim of this contribution to be pretentious, or at least 
inappropriate, from a purely Comparative law perspective. This would be a conservative reaction to the 
fact that, over the last two decades, Comparative law has branched out in new directions, galvanising 
legal theorists and practitioners, sparking novel sociopolitical, legal, and business models, and attracting 
                                                          
53 MacPherson (1962), pp. 3, 22, 29, and 46. 
54 Agamben (1998), p. 105. 
55 Arendt (1973), p. 157. 
56 Agamben (2011), pp. 286–87. See also Agamben (2015), pp. 42–69. 
57 Agamben (2012), p. 4 
58 D’Agostini (2014). 
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worldwide attention. Despite arguments to the contrary, Comparative law has thus become a key 
instrument of thought. The need that has emerged in recent years to introduce the reader to Comparative 
law discourse,59 as well as the multitude of studies that have appeared on its method(s) and culture(s),60 
are indicative of the fact that ‘comparative law is constantly evolving, in imperfect parallel with the 
development of law, and society, at large’.61  
This attitude has had an inevitable impact on the boundaries, and thus identity, of Comparative 
law itself, as is demonstrated by the way in which scholars from different disciplines have contributed 
to what was once seen as an exclusively internal debate. This was primarily caused by the attraction 
that the concept of (legal) ‘culture’ (and thus, I would add, ‘consciousness’ in Gadamerian terms) began 
to develop for comparatists, and by the subsequent need to clarify what it could reveal and eventually 
lead to.62 Fletcher’s belief that the value of applying the comparative inquiry to the legal domain lies in 
the fact that ‘it expands the agenda of available possibilities’63 is a clear testament to this in that it poses 
the basis for cultural criticism. It cannot be doubted that while trying to understand the political 
relationship between law’s regulative instances and those it tries to protect by imposing respect for itself 
and/or stimulating that respect, comparatists, legal sociologists and, in part, legal anthropologists and 
historians have entered each other’s areas of specialisation; they have ‘borrowed’ notions, doctrines, 
methodologies and strategies in adopting the same constructivist logic of ‘transplant’ that the majority 
of them criticised when arguing for the need to respect what identifies the ‘other’. 
This doctrinal trend deserves an extended treatment, certainly more than can be provided here. 
It must thus suffice to highlight that the uniqueness that characterises the comparative method and its 
aims has certainly been influenced by it—positively or negatively, depending on the perspective of 
inquiry. The issue then arises as to whether this scholarly approach to Comparative law poses a threat 
to law’s existential special domain 64 —that is, to the essence of the authoritarian and sovereign 
institutionalising processes that render law properly legal within normative discourse and power theory. 
Perhaps the answer to this interrogative may be found in the extent to which the crucial distinction 
between social rules and legal norms has been mistakenly displaced from view within legal discourse. 
And indeed, it is indicative of the confusion that affects the debate that we have reached a stage at which 
it is thought that the comparative assessment of legal phenomena may be done through the analysis of 
‘empirically substantiated behavioural patterns’,65 thus obscuring how and why law’s mythical essence 
and anthropological and sociopolitical existential function depend on the subject’s free action.66 
                                                          
59 Husa (2015); Tushnet (2014); Samuel (2014); Smits (2014), Örücü and Nelken (2007); Gordley (2006). 
60 Adams and Heirbaut (2014); Adams and Bomhoff (2012); Van Hoecke (2011); Van Hoecke (2004); Siems 
(2014); Monateri (2012); Clark (2012). 
61 Michaels (2015), p. 1. 
62 Legrand and Munday (2003); Nelken, Feest (2001); Nelken (1997). 
63 Fletcher (1998), p. 69. 
64 In addition to Cotterrell’s (2013), p. 23, scholarship on law ‘as a flexible, but distinctive and unifying, value 
structure’ with ‘a specific effectivity’, see Bertea (2009) and Croce (2014). 
65 de Coninck (2010), p. 348; de Conick (2012). See also Parisi and Luppi (2012). 
66 Siliquini-Cinelli (2015a). 
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Yet it could be conceded that this may be an inevitable outcome in an age of numberless 
processes of diversification or fragmentation—i.e., of pluralisation of regulative sources and norm-
setting bodies at the macro, meso, and micro levels, as well as of ‘regime shifting’67 mechanisms. Hence 
Séan Patrick Donlan rightly pointed out that Comparative law’s ‘methodological pluralism’ has become 
the ‘norm’ in Comparative law.68 Having a multidisciplinary approach to (comparative) law and legal 
reasoning is indeed indispensable to overcoming the limits of reductionist approaches.69 Pihlajämaki’s 
belief that ‘[w]e should not become obsessive about defining disciplinary boundaries now that we have 
finally managed to start removing them’70 is therefore more than welcome. Yet every interdisciplinary 
method may also prove to be unsatisfactory.71 The time seems therefore ripe to admit that the confusion 
that this process has generated constitutes not the consequence, but rather the cause, of why, in Örücü’s 
words, ‘the basic problems [of comparative law] have remained the same’, and why ‘[t]here is no one 
definition of what comparative law and comparative method are’.72 Millns’ consideration that ‘the 
methodology of legal comparison remains relatively unadvanced’ should thus be investigated from this 
critical perspective.73 
From a purely methodological point of view, this means that the two main questions upon which 
the comparative enterprise within the legal discourse is based, namely ‘what is law’ and ‘what is 
comparison’,74 are still to be answered. Thus, if one seeks a better understanding of what Comparative 
law is about, s/he would have to make sense of a series of arguments according to which various things 
should be compared. These things include cases (Markesinis); legal systems or their rules (Watson); the 
relationship among system theories (or assumptions and idea) as forces capable of ‘structuring’ legal 
rules (Luhmann, Valcke); legal systems and their institutions (Bell and, in part, Örücü); the evolutionary 
stages of legal concepts and legal institutions (Gutteridge); legal rules in context (Siems, and Örücü, 
who includes in this notion ‘the mysteries of the interaction of social norms and legal rules’75); (legal) 
attitudes (and, thus, commitments) and (concepts of) laws intended neither as ‘real/objective facts’ nor 
as (positivistic) ‘rules’ as ‘acts of communication’ (Van Hoecke, Samuel); legal institutions and the 
‘prevailing styles of legal thought’ (Ewald); legal arguments or the language used in them (Bomhoff, 
Fletcher respectively); institutions and the intellectual structures that express them (Sunde); sets of legal 
rules, legal domains, forms of legal reasoning (Valcke and Grellette); legal-cultural developments and 
their adaptation (Nelken); the ‘cognitive structure’ of a legal culture (Legrand, whose quotation usually 
                                                          
67 Benvenisti and Downs (2007); Zürn and Faude (2013). 
68 Donlan (2014). 
69 Redgwell (2012); Siliquini-Cinelli (2014). 
70 Pihlajämaki (2014), p. 121. 
71 Husa (2014b). 
72 Örücü (2007), p. 43. A suggestion that seems to be supported by Cotterrell’s (at times ambiguous) belief that 
comparative law’s and legal sociology’s ‘most general and most scientific projects—to understand law in its 
development and its variety as an aspect of social life—are identical’ see Cotterrell (2003), p. 134. 
73 Millns (2014), p. 285. 
74 Samuel (2014a); Samuel (2014b); Samuel (1998). 
75 Örücü (2007), p. 58. 
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leads to that of Watson in light of the debate which their opposing approaches to legal transplants has 
generated); concepts of law (Donlan, Heckendorn, Van Hoecke, Husa, Nelken, Melissaris, and other 
legal pluralists); historical developments in the law (Donlan); legal traditions as ‘sets of information’ 
(Glenn), legal ideologies (Cotterrell); the economic efficiency of a norm (Parisi, Luppi); EU policies 
and their implementation (Knill); and legal anthropologies (Mertz, Goodale) and physiologies (Horry, 
Plamer, Brewer, Cutler). Stemming from the broad field of Public/Constitutional and Administrative 
Comparative law, we could also include in the list judicial politics (Chavez, Ginsburg, Vanberg, 
Hirschl, Halberstam, Sheppele), the development of constitutional scholarship (von Bogdandy), and 
counter-terrorism laws (Kent, Roach). 
William Twining is therefore right when he writes that ‘comparative law has not defined 
subject-matter’.76 In addition, if Comparative law has witnessed an explosion, as Smits noted,77 this has 
surely been responsible for methodological confusion. It thus cannot surprise anyone that it was the 
comparatists themselves who blurred one of the most important distinctions behind what makes us 
human—namely that between ‘knowledge’ and experience’—a distinction that, I believe, should be 
rediscovered and vehemently promoted in the challenge to our behavioural ‘form-of-(non-)living.’ 
Indeed, Comparative law is either—and simultaneously and/or indirectly78—understood as a 
discipline/technique/intellectual activity (Frankenberg, Muir Watt, Van Hoecke, Glenn, Fletcher, Hage, 
Örücü, Michaels, Samuel, Bell, Adams, Jansen, Löhnig, Monateri, Andenas, Fairgrieve, Rosenfeld, 
Sajó, Clark, Stapleton, von Bogdandy), as a science (Rabel, Sacco, Gutteridge, Örücü, Van Hoecke, 
Millns, Husa, Hage, Cotterrell, Samuel, Bell, Grossfeld, Valcke, Grellette), or as an act of (local and 
cultural) experience (Curran, Millns, Nelken, Örücü, Grossfeld, Sunde, Adams, Cotterrell, 
Brownsword, Legrand, Bell, Lasser, Husa, King, Dupret—a vision that has been endorsed by those who 
understand the legal phenomenon in terms of a ‘shared normative experience’79). Finally, there are 
commentators who, in addressing Comparative law’s functional attitude as put forward by Zweigert 
and Kötz (and further pursued by Husa, Michaels, de Coninck, and in part, Valcke, and Grellette), make 
                                                          
76 Twining (2000), p. 45. On comparative law’s limits in overcoming the challenges that globalisation poses to 
legal scholarship, see Goodwin (2013), pp. 692–94. 
77 Smits (2006). 
78 I think here of Husa (2014a), p. 55, who, while arguing in favour of ‘epistemological realism’ to overcome the 
comparatist’s dependence on ‘his/her experience of the world’, describes ‘comparative law as a target-oriented 
action aimed at new knowledge’. This is also the case with Valcke and Grellette (2014), p. 101, who first suggest 
that ‘any comparison . . . entails first delineating the objects in a neutral way’, and yet maintain that ‘this 
delineating act is particularly delicate when it comes to law’. The ‘this’ clearly takes us back to comparison, 
broadly understood. The active experience of the comparatist seems therefore to appear in there as well, 
notwithstanding the neutrality of the operation Valcke and Grellette describe. Moreover, the semi-neutral essence 
of this modus comparandi seems to be further confirmed when Valcke speaks of the ‘act of comparison’ when 
discussing again the comparative method in general. This is a term that Valcke uses to highlight the ‘interpretative’ 
essence of comparative law. See Valcke (2012), p. 48; see also Bell (2011). Thus, even though Van Hoecke 
(2014), p. 45, does not share Valcke’s approach to comparative law, it seems that Valcke and Grellette ultimately 
agree with him that ‘[t]here are not “objective” choices, but only “subjective” ones’. Valcke and Grellette (2013), 
p. 10. 
79 Melissaris (2009); Melissaris (2014). 
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a claim for the impossibility of reducing its aims to a single methodology of inquiry (Gutteridge, Örücü, 
Glenn, Brownsword, Adams, Griffiths, Donlan, von Bar, Karhu); others, however, argue for the 
importance of recognising the possible ‘subversive’ attitude of Comparative law (Fletcher, Muir Watt), 
or of having a legal-hermeneutical (Legrand), legal-cultural (Van Hoecke and Warrington), cultural-
epistemological (Samuel), heuristic (Husa) or descriptive or purposive approach to it (McEvoy, 
Valcke). 
The variety of these approaches is clearly rooted in the multiple substrata that characterise law’s 
‘norm-alising’ enterprise. In addition, their pluralistic essence is informed by the roadmap pursued by 
contemporary legal scholarship broadly understood, which is to use the ‘multiple shifting boundaries 
of law—as discipline, as practice, as focus of study, as form of knowledge’80 to try to explain the law’s 
detachment from the state. More importantly for our purposes, from a purely Comparative law 
perspective, these accounts seem to find a unifying sentiment in the belief that the comparative method 
is an ‘empirical, descriptive research design using “comparison” as a technique to cognise’,81 as well as 
in those accounts that define Comparative law in terms of a multi-featured ‘disciplined practice’.82 
Considering, on the one hand, Pascal’s suggestion that there is nothing in the real world that can escape 
the explanatory temptation of scientific reason and, on the other hand, the wave of disciplinary 
borrowing described above, it is anything but a coincidence that these claims seem to be in line with 
the school of thought according to which culture is a ‘moral  and cognitive experience’ and that ‘[a]ny 
juristic study is . . . a social practice, an intervention in the social world and a way of interpreting that 
world’83).  
In this respect, what is surprising about the dynamics these accounts express is the extent of the 
displacement of the anthropological and philosophical difference between ‘knowledge’ (cognitum) and 
‘experience’ (nōtum), or between behaviour and action, objective scientific reason that opens a space 
that remains empty84 and subjective being-in-there that fills that space. Among other factors, this 
dichotomy has informed the very essence and development of the Western tradition since Pythagoras. 
It would be beyond the scope of our analysis to describe its emergence and trajectory to date. It must 
suffice to spend a few words on those thinkers whose reflections may help explain what will be claimed 
in the next section of this contribution, namely Heidegger, Cassirer, and Agamben. 
Heidegger thought it necessary to reconsider completely the problem of knowledge in order to 
demonstrate that it cannot be solved by distinguishing between subject and object. Through a reasoning 
that will take him close to Parmenides’ insights,85 Heidegger challenged the metaphysical assumptions 
                                                          
80 Dedek and van Pragah (2015), p. xv. 
81 Örücü (2007), p. 48. 
82 Adams and Bomhoff (2012), p. 4. 
83 Cotterrell (2008), pp. 308 and 43 respectively (emphases added). See also Cotterrell (2012). 
84 Kahn (2010), p. 175, according to whom ‘[r]eason is not self-defining’. See also Kahn (2008). 
85 Although in a different way, Heidegger put forward this argument throughout his scholarship. See paragraphs 
12–13 of Being and Time, as well as On the Essence of Truth, Letter on Humanism, The Thing, The Age of World 
Picture, Introduction to Metaphysics, What is Called Thinking?, Identity and Difference, Discourse on Thinking, 
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of scientific knowledge by reaffirming the primacy of man’s phenomenological ‘ek-sistence’ against 
the illusion brought about by the Western ‘onto-theo-logical’ tradition as initiated by Plato and 
Aristotle. This also led him to challenge both the functionalisation of the spirit and modern subjectivism 
as prompted by Descartes, according to whom knowing is the primary mode of interaction between the 
subject and an object. To the contrary, Heidegger pointed at what precedes the cogito. By delving into 
the original and modern meanings of (scientific) method, technē, and ēpisēme, Heidegger insisted on 
Dasein’s phenomenological encounter with what constitutes its ‘ek-sistence’.86 Yet, as will be discussed 
towards the end of the chapter, the ‘unfolding’ of this phenomenon depends, in turn, on our willingness 
‘to stand in the openness of beings’.87 
In a no-less-revolutionary and yet completely different way, Cassirer united several opposing 
claims when inquiring into the cultural debacle of modern times, which in his view is related to science’s 
focus on the cause of phenomena and its aim to simplify the accidental particularity of reality and our 
experience of it. In particular, Cassirer was of the opinion that human experience had always been ‘an 
organized and articulated experience’.88 ‘What is commonly called the sensory consciousness, the 
content of the “world perception”’, he wrote in the second volume of The Philosophy of Symbolic 
Forms, ‘. . . this is itself a product of abstraction, a theoretical elaboration of the “given”’.89 This 
theoretical process is nothing but ‘perceptive knowledge’: ‘[a]ll conceptual knowledge is necessarily 
based on intuitive knowledge, and all intuitive knowledge on perceptive knowledge’.90 This explains 
why ‘symbolic expression is the common denominator in all [man’s] activities’.91 From this it flows 
that the problem of human knowledge cannot be understood without delving into the relationship 
between man and the symbolic forms that reality (and, thus, the experience we make of it) may 
assume.92 As was pointed out in the essay known in English as The Logic of the Cultural Sciences, this 
is so because neither (scientific) thought nor experience ‘is able to determinate the “initself” of man 
except by pointing it out in the phenomena’.93 Thus, ‘instead of saying that the human intellect is in 
need of “images” we should rather say that it is in need of symbols’ as ‘refracting media’.94 In contrast 
with Heidegger, Cassirer thus found in the phenomenology of the symbol(s) the way to explain why the 
                                                          
The Nature of Language, The Question Concerning Technology, and Modern Science, Metaphysics, and 
Mathematics. 
86 Heidegger (2008), p. 88. See also ibid., p. 237.  
87 Heidegger (2014), p. 24. See also ibid., pp. 15,  23–24, 33, 49, and 189. See below note 173. 
88 Cassirer (1944), p. 208. See also ibid., pp. 29, 34, 60, and 73. 
89 Cassirer ([1925] 1955), p. xvi (emphasis added). See also Cassirer ([1923] 1955), pp. 89, 107, 111, and 114; 
Cassirer  (1957), p. xiii 
90 Cassirer (1957), p. 47. Cotterrell’s notion of ‘cognitive experience’, mentioned earlier, is in line with this form 
of perceptive knowledge. 
91 Cassirer (1946), p. 45. 
92 See, in particular, Cassirer (1996), pp. 194–200. 
93 Cassirer (2000), p. 102. 
94 Cassirer (1944), p. 57 and (1957), p. 1. 
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problem of representation (and, thus, perception, conception, and expression) is itself ‘the central 
problem of knowledge’.95 
According to Cassirer, there is a clear zone of indistinction, or intersection, between pure 
immediacy and epistemological thought. This zone is represented by the symbol, that is, by the 
instrument with which we mediate reality and make a synthesis of it (‘all cultural activities . . . fulfil 
one and he same task: the task of objectification’.96 The symbol thus mediates between reality and 
subjectivity because, instead of having independent ‘existence as part of the physical world[,] it has 
“meaning”’.97 This is why, in the history of humankind, the symbol has assumed different forms: myth, 
language, religion, art, history, and science. In this sense, what matters for our purposes here is that: 1) 
as the structure of perceptive knowledge demonstrates, the symbol operates even in the first and entirely 
non-scientific category of apprehension and self-consciousness, that of the myth (which is why Cassirer 
could argue that the ‘relations which [myth] postulates are not logical relations’ and at the same time 
speak of ‘mythical thinking’); 2) while myth, language, religion, history, and art are influenced by 
human experience, the essence of all perceptive-organisational form(s) of representation has been 
nullified by scientific-rational thought. More precisely, the modality through which sense-experience 
produces self-consciousness has become entirely systematic, and turned out to be knowledge once a 
totalising intellectual symbol (science) entered the scene. Moved by the ‘arrogance’ of providing reality 
with an organising and indifferent unity, this new ‘form of objectification’ ‘has no actual existence as 
a part of the physical world; it has a “meaning”’.98 Moved by the ‘arrogance’ of providing reality with 
an organising and indifferent unity of phenomenological understanding, science is a ‘stage of theoretical 
knowledge [that] creates a new form of objectification’.99 Thus, to Cassirer, ‘[t]o “know” is to advance 
from the immediacy of sensation and perception to the purely cogitated and mediated “cause,” to dissect 
the simple matter of sensory impressions into strata of “grounds” and “consequences”’.100 
Agamben too discussed the dichotomy between knowledge and experience, clarifying that 
while science (whose subject ‘is the noūs . . . which is separate from experience, “impassive” and 
“divine”’101) is aimed at achieving verifiable knowledge, experience (whose subject is ‘common sense, 
something existing in every individual’) ‘is incompatible with certainty [because] once an experience 
has become measurable and certain, it immediately loses its authority’.102 To understand this fully, we 
must first internalise that ‘for Antiquity the central problem of knowledge is not the relationship 
between a subject and an object, but the relationship between the one and the many’. This is so because 
                                                          
95 Cassirer (1996), p. 193. 
96 Cassirer (1946), p. 45. 
97 Cassirer (1944), p. 57. 
98 Cassirer (1996), p. 217; Cassirer (1944), p. 57. 
99 Cassirer (1996), p. 217. 
100 Cassirer (1955), p. 73. 
101 Agamben (2007), p. 18. 
102 Ibid. p. 20. Cassirer also writes that ‘[i]n the objective content of science individual features are forgotten and 
effaced, for one of the principal aims of scientific thought is the elimination of all personal and anthropomorphic 
elements. See Cassirer (1944), pp. 1–22, 207–21, and 228. 
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‘what is posed for us as the question of experience arose in Antiquity as the question of the relation . . 
. between the separate intellect and particular individuals, between the one and the many, between the 
intelligible and the sensory, between the human and the divine’. This is why, Agamben notes, by 
remaining ‘faithful to the separation of experience and science, human knowledge and divine 
knowledge’, ‘[t]raditional experience . . . is in fact the experience of the boundary between these two 
spheres[, namely] death’.103 
The distinction between intellectual knowledge and praxis constitutes the pillar of Agamben’s 
inquiry into the illusion that characterises the Western notion civilisation.104 What is worth noticing for 
the scope of this contribution is that, through a distortive anthropological shift, modern science has 
abolished the distinction between knowledge and experience by making the latter ‘the locus—the 
“method”; that is, the pathway—of knowledge’.105 Cassirer offered a similar historical reconstruction; 
in explaining why the ‘modern theory of man lost its intellectual centre [through] a complete anarchy 
of thought’, he maintained that in modern times ‘the quest is . . . for a general theory of man based on 
empirical observations and on general logical principles [through] the [scientific] removal of all the 
artificial barriers that had hitherto separated the human world from the rest of the nature’. 106 
Unfortunately, for scientific behaviour to absorb the boundlessness, unpredictability, and fallibility of 
any act of experience, its promoters had to ‘recast experience and rethink intelligence, first of all 
expropriating their different subjects and replacing them with a single new subject . . . which is none 
other than their conjunction at an abstract Archimedean point: the Cartesian cogito, consciousness’.107 
In this sense, the total penetration of this mechanical form-of-(non-)living into the deliberative 
and fallible formation and performance of our volitions, and thus into the active determination and 
experience of our uniqueness, should lead us to admit that ‘the question of experience can be approached 
nowadays only with an acknowledgement that it is no longer accessible to us’. This is so because of the 
role assumed by the ‘experiment’, which is the enactment of the ‘scientific verification of experience . 
. . permitting sensory impression to be deduced with the exactitude of quantitative determinations and, 
therefore, the prediction of future impressions’. This anthropological shift, Agamben further maintains, 
has displaced experience ‘as far as possible outside the individual: on to instruments and numbers’.108 
Cassirer had assigned to the scientific experiment the same anthropological role fifty years 
before Agamben.109 Later on in his research, he held that ‘[h]uman culture taken as a whole may be 
described as the process of man’s progressive self-liberation’ from the conflicting oscillation between 
‘stabilisation’ and ‘evolution’, ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’, ‘universality’ and ‘individuality’ that has 
                                                          
103 Ibid., p. 121. 
104 Agamben (2011), pp. 122 and 141. Similarly, Marramo (2005); Marramao (2007), Marramao (2013) places 
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105 Agamben (2007), p. 22. 
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afflicted humans ever since.110 By offering us the ‘assurance of a constant world’,111 and thus perfect 
harmony through which to control the chaotic movement of what makes us human, science has become 
the main tool in the quest for this self-liberating order from the ‘reason’ / ‘imagination’ dichotomy.  
The re-discovery of the relationship between self-dissolving knowledge and behaviour and self-
defining experience and action may therefore shed new light on the paradoxical condition of the pactum 
in the Public and Private law dimensions that lies at the centre of the chapter, and thus, on what unites 
the fictional nature of nation-state and the roadmap pursued by the promoters of a global model of 
society underpinned by notions of ‘civilised economy’ and ‘good economic governance.’ If we agree 
with Cassirer that the alleged objectiveness of reality is always tested by the critical character of our 
sensory consciousness,112 we may soon realise that what we (think) we know about these facts is 
actually very different from the daily experience we have of them. 
 
 
4 Pactum, Oath, and (Good) Faith 
 
4.1. Why Hobbes 
 
The necessity of saying a few words on the need to re-discover the importance of the distinction between 
knowledge and experience in Constitutional and Contract law discourse is not only related to the role 
that the latter has in theoretical inquiry. What is of significance for present purposes is rather that, 
according to Arendt, it was experience (and in particular, the experience of freedom) that rendered the 
American Revolution successful, unlike its French counterpart,113 and that Hobbes himself put this 
dichotomy at the centre of his reflections on the formation and functioning of body politic,114  Indeed, 
it is through the systematic and mechanic conceptualisation of reality that, as Pocock has carefully 
discussed, Hobbes ‘historicis[ed] faith in a new way, one of the highest relevance to politics’.115 This 
was done by ‘declaring God to be non-existent or irrelevant [because] the whole body of our faith is 
reducible to the construction of a system of authors and of authority, existing through time and resting 
on the statements they transmit, our opinion of the authority they have as transmitters, and the authority 
of the previous speakers, back to God himself, whom we accept as author in the act of accepting any 
one of them’.116  
This also suggests that the constitution of the Leviathan may be considered as one of 
Heidegger’s ‘inceptions’ through which, since Plato, Western metaphysical thought has displaced the 
                                                          
110 Cassirer (1944), pp. 222–228, at 228; see also Cassirer (2000). 
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self-conscious human subject and thus the radically finite meaning of human existence. It is indeed 
anything but a coincidence that, while listing the elements of which the statum civitatis as common-
wealth is made, Hobbes adds the particle ‘good’ before ‘will’.117 Hobbes’ aim is to captivate human 
conduct118 by setting a limit for something that, being irreducible, cannot, per se, be imprisoned. More 
precisely, believing that man’s sinful nature is what causes death among men, Hobbes captivated human 
action by setting a limit on its essence and performativity so that it could be transformed into behaviour, 
that is, into a form of conduct that can be controlled. The constitution of the sovereign demands the 
nullification of the self-asserting ‘I-will’ and its compliance with what Kant, the philosophical father of 
capitalist reason and distribution of property rights, 119  will define as the universal ‘categorical 
imperative’ (‘I-will-and-cannot’, to be discussed below).  
Hence Hobbes’ political project falls within the broad purview of foundational 
constitutionalism, that is the ‘idea of a political and social order not based on history and tradition but 
shaped by humankind along rational lines’. 120  From this it follows that Hobbes is the key to 
understanding the ‘form-of-(non-)living’ that underpins our global age. Some commentators may 
propose that this could be contended for all the political philosophers of the seventeenth century, 
particularly Locke. However, it was with Hobbes that the modern administrative ufficium of mechanical 
governance was inaugurated, in which, to use Pocock’s words, ‘the whole content of revealed religion 
is potentially of concern to the civil magistrate’.121 By ‘religion’ we should mean the juridico-political 
deditio in fidem that in Greek and Roman times linked the city and the people together.122 The term 
‘concern’ indicates instead the theoretical premise for the practical voiding that the Hobbesian 
sovereign, as mere civil magistrate, makes of the public-religious bond with the intent to let civil 
society’s capitalist (and, thus, scientific) interests dissolve the act of political government. In this way, 
through what Legendre has rightly defined as the ‘logic of assembling’, the sociopolitical and economic 
order are continuously created, destroyed, and re-created for instrumentalist economic purposes as 
needed. 123  If ‘the established tradition of bourgeois society [is] to consider political institutions 
exclusively as an instrument for the protection of private property’,124 it becomes evident why ‘Hobbes 
. . . is the only great philosopher to whom the bourgeoisie can rightly and exclusively lay claim’.125 
Arendt has noted that the first step in this roadmap was taken when the bourgeois as ‘ruling class in 
capitalist production . . . turned to politics out of economic necessity’.126 Our duty is to point out that 
                                                          
117 Hobbes (1998), p. 116. See also Hobbes (1990), pp. 42 and 58. 
118 Cf. Holmes, above note 113, p. xi. See also Galimberti (2016), p. 411, and pp. 442–446. Contra, see Cavalletti 
(2005), p.160. 
119 On this point, see Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals and Benjamin’s Capitalism as Religion. 
120 Krisch (2012), p. 18. 
121 Pocock (1989), p. 166.  
122 In different terms, see Schiavone (2012), pp. 123–125. 
123 Legendre (2009), p. 41. See also Supiot (2007), p. 31. 
124 Arendt (1973), p. 149. 
125 Ibid., p. 139. 
126 Ibid., p. 126. 
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this is, in truth, a never-ending process because such emancipation can only be protected as long as 
‘wealth’ is used as ‘capital’ through reification.127 
Once we acknowledge this, it becomes clear why the intrusion of the administrative technē 
oikonomikē within the domain of the political has not only caused the erosion of the democratic 
conception of substantial equality but has also determined the birth of the modern state as a mere 
bureaucratic administrative apparatus in the Weberian sense. To link Weber’s notion of ‘rational 
bourgeois economic life’ and Agamben’s above-quoted conviction that ‘the planetary petty bourgeoisie 
is probably the form in which humanity is moving toward its own destruction’ is thus inevitable. If, 
indeed, ‘the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political’,128 what remains in front of us 
is nothing but a value-free and post-political homo animalis who administers the reason and interest-
oriented behavioural interaction of (non-)humans as contracting units.  
 
 
4.2. Why Good Faith? 
 
Civil law jurisdictions have always had a strong approach to good faith. The fact that the Italian 1942 
Civil code was the first in Europe to contain a specific provision on pre-contractual good faith is just an 
example.129 Others may be Rudolph von Jhering’s and Gabriele Fagella’s 1860 and 1906 accounts of 
the importance of culpa in contrahendo and bona fides,130 or Emilio Betti’s insistence on an integrative 
approach to good faith according to which each party has the implied duty to take into account the 
other’s rights and interests.131  
The Common law courts’ recent interest in contractual faithfulness, however, stands in clear 
opposition to the self-interested logic that underpins both the bargain theory of consideration at the 
private level and Hobbes’ project at the public one. This innovative trend should not be taken for 
granted, as the neoclassical ‘consideration-offer-acceptance’ trinity 132  of the civilising mission of 
contract has not only played a pivotal role in the development of the Common law tradition to date, but, 
among other factors, has determined the World Trade Organisation’s preference for Common law 
systems. To comprehend this fully, our efforts should also focus on why, over the last few years, 
countless commentators have offered their views on the displacement of traditional politico-juridical 
categories by inquiring into humankind’s animalisation. 
                                                          
127 Arendt (1998), p.139 and pp. 299–300. 
128 Schmitt (2007), p. 19. 
129 Cf. Art. 1337 Civil code. 
130 See, respectively, Culpa in Contrahendo der Schadensersatz bei nichtigen oder nicht zur Perfection gelangten 
Verträgen, in Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen röminschen und deutschen Privatrechts, IV.1; Dei 
Periodi Precontrattuali e della loro vera ed esatta costruzione scientifica, in Studi Giuridici in Onore di Carlo 
Fadda, III, 271. In particular, Fagella showed the importance of distinguishing three different periods of good 
faith (the period before any offer has been drafted; the period during which an offer is drafted; the period when 
the offer has been made). Cf. Saleilles (1907). 
131 Betti (1953), p. 90.  
132 Hamson (1938), p. 234. 
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Sociopolitical and legal theorists, as well as philosophers are well aware of the imperativeness 
of the post-humanist challenge brought about by the global governance model of the lex mercatoria. 
The political use of contractual good faith at the centre of this contribution, I contend, suggests that the 
solution to this delicate post-humanist issue is (also) coming from the Private law sphere. While 
describing the ideology of contractualism, mentioned earlier, Supiot has acutely noted that ‘questions 
that were previously the remit of the State are now referred to the contract and negotiation’.133 The 
movement toward the conceptualisation of good faith as an implied term and organising principle, I 
submit, ought to be inscribed within this phenomenon. More precisely, it is due to the need to 
counterbalance our inhuman condition.134 
Once analysed from this perspective of inquiry, it emerges that what we are witnessing through 
the emphasis on good faith in Contract law theory and practice is the use of Private law’s symbolic 
normative forms to contrast with the dissolution of the public sphere. 
That this contradictory phenomenon cannot be understood without inquiring into the illusionist 
scheme that led to the creation of the Hobbesian common-wealth is proved by the way in which 
Australian courts have been using the doctrine of good faith over the last two decades. Australia lacks 
a comprehensive protection of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms at the federal level. This is 
because its Constitution has neither a Bill of Rights nor strong and effective equal-treatment provisions. 
As a result, the Australian judge is, so to speak, ‘forced’ to prioritise a contextual rather than formalist 
approach to ensure respect for fundamental values.135 As the development of the role of good faith in 
contracting suggests, Australian courts use the law of contract at times to establish at the private level 
what the public one cannot provide. This is so notwithstanding the changes in judicial trajectories with 
respect to the source, content, and extent of a general contractual duty of good faith, which should be 
inscribed in the understandable need for caution.136 Similarly, the transplant of the Human Rights and 
unfair contract terms of supra-national regimes into the UK through the Human Rights Act 1998 and 
the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 makes the interpreter wonder why, in the 
land of Walford v. Miles in which good faith has long been considered a ‘legal irritant’,137 the theoretical 
                                                          
133 Supiot (2007), p. 103 
134 Cf. Schiavone (2012), pp. 145–153 and 221–224. 
135 On this point, see George Williams’ scholarship on Human Rights protection. 
136 In Pacioccio v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited, quoted above, note 22, Allsop CJ described 
good faith as a ‘normative standard’ and further maintained that ‘it is a good example of the presence of values in 
the common law’, at paras 290 and 287 respectively. His Honour also described good faith ‘as an implication or 
feature of Australian contract law attending the performance of the bargain and its construction and implied 
content’, at para 287. The lead on this issue was taken in the early 1990s by the New South Wales Court of Appeal, 
followed by the Victorian Court of Appeal and the Federal Court. The debate about the existence of an implied 
contractual obligation of good faith tends to be accompanied by that about the effective purview of its content 
(i.e., reasonableness, fair dealing, etc.) and the existence of fiduciary obligations. Recently, cf. Mineralogy Pty 
Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 6), [2015] FCA 825 (Federal Court of Australia), paras 998–1019. 
137 Teubner (1998), p. 11. To be compared with the more recent developments quoted above, note 22. 
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accomplishment of the transition ‘from liberties to rights’ 138  could not have been obtained 
independently from within.  
The combination of these facts with the pre-juridical, mythical origins of faith and action139 and 
the importance that good faith is assuming within the Common law tradition should make us wonder 
whether we are in fact capable of internalising what the mythical, faithful bond that lies at the core of 
the pactum really entails. At first glance, the answer appears to be that we can comprehend and describe 
it in light of our existential need to make sense of the phenomena that shape our lives. And indeed, 
Cassirer was of the opinion that, particularly in the sphere of myth, ‘we sense . . . the feeling that human 
culture is not something given and self-evident, but rather that it is a kind of miracle that requires 
explanation’.140  
Unfortunately, our intellectual enterprise to discern the humanising force that, through action, 
good faith plays in Contract law can be immediately challenged from the outset by the very supra-
logical essence of any faithful act. If there is one clear message to be taken from Kierkegaard’s Fear 
and Trembling, it is that the realm of faith is inaccessible to human discourse and logic. Yet it might be 
noted that this is, in truth, not even a matter of concern in our post-historical and post-political age—
the reason being, as mentioned earlier, that what constitutes human uniqueness is to be found in our 
power-to-will, that is, in our faculty to decide both ‘for’ and ‘against’ something or someone and then 
act-ively perform our volition in deciding who we are as persons. And if we bear in mind that the law’s 
regulative function depends on the interference of the jurist over the (actively decisive) unpredictability 
of what makes us human,141 it follows that the behavioural modes of human existence and socialisation 
at the centre of this contribution displace the need for political and juridical subjectivitisation and 
representation.  
In other words, if what makes us human is unable to perform itself through the constitutive 
essence of political action, we no longer have any existential experience of ourselves. This also explains 
why the shift from ‘input’ to ‘output’ forms of legitimation and accountability in which the 
experimentalist architecture of inter-connected channels of post-national governance is rooted is one of 
the main aspects of the current dissolution of what makes us human: in an age in which authority and 
its foundation have disappeared, there have emerged liquid, soft-networked schemes of post-national 
governance—that is, value-free mechanisms that transcend state-based patterns of government and 
regulation—that work according to ‘output’ forms of legitimation and accountability.142 
For the very same reason, however, the Common law judge’s interest in the faithful, and thus 
mythical, component of the contractual bond may be interpreted as an attempt to put the self-defining 
                                                          
138 Costigan and Thomas (2005), p. 51. But see also du Bois’ contribution to this book, arguing the Human Rights 
Act has had very little impact thus far on the law of contract. 
139 Agamben (2005); Agamben (2011), pp. 15–29; Agamben (2016), p. 23. 
140 Cassirer (2000), p. 3. 
141 Heidegger (2012), p. 31; Heidegger (2008), pp. 283–84. 
142 Siliquini-Cinelli (2015a). 
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(i.e., humanising) properties of action back on stage through contracts. Yet it could be argued that by 
imposing the duty to act in good faith upon the parties to a contract, the Common law judge is in fact 
reproducing within the Private law dimension Hobbes’ behavioural mechanisms of societal interaction, 
and thus, limiting private autonomy. However sound, this argument would not consider what is required 
for the mythical component of an act of (good) faith to perform its humanising instances and constitute 
both individual and collective forms of experience. 
Mythical thinking, human experience, and action are all related. Cassirer demonstrated this 
clearly. While explaining that ‘myth . . . expresses an original direction of the human spirit, an 
independent configuration of man’s consciousness’,143 Cassirer held that ‘mythical consciousness . . . 
“explains” the individual event by postulating individual acts of the will’.144 It is in this sense that we 
should overlap Hobbes’ intention to neutralise human action with Cassirer’s explanation of why 
mythical consciousness depends ‘on man’s self-limitation in his immediate relation to reality, as a 
willing and acting subject’.145  
The same applies to the mythical essence of (good) faith. As set out by Agamben, ‘fides is . . . 
a verbal act, as a rule accompanied by an oath, with which one abandons oneself completely to the 
“trust” of someone and obtains, in exchange, that one’s protection. The object of the fides is, in every 
case, as in the oath, conformity between the parties’ words and actions.’146 From this passage it emerges 
that in an age such as ours, in which financial and free-market-capitalist praxis feed on depoliticisation 
and dejuridification by making (non-)humans mechanically behave rather than spontaneously act, the 
mythical and sacred (p)act of (good) faith that should hold humankind together at the public level 
becomes irrelevant. That is why, at the time of writing, politics has ‘assume[d] the form of an 
oikonomia, that is, of a governance of empty speech over bare life’.147 Conversely, the performative 
essence of the faithful bond that characterises the contract within the Private law dimension leads to the 
rediscovery of action and language through the deactivation of homo oeconomicus’ behavioural 
schemes of interaction.  
That said, the last element that we need in order to understand fully what is happening to the 
(p)act of deditio in fidem on the public and private scales in the West is Kant’s categorical imperative 
to ‘act according to that maxim whose universality as law you can at the same time will’.148 The reason 
for addressing Kant’s maxim is threefold: first, because of Agamben’s argument on the dehumanising 
function played by modern Human Rights charters; second, because, as pointed out earlier, the 
formation of Hobbes’ dehumanising common-wealth required the nullification of the self-asserting ‘I-
will’ and its compliance with Kant’s categorical ‘I-will-and-cannot’; finally, because while Kant 
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conceived of the categorical imperative as a way to protect capital interests and property rights, legal 
scholars have, perhaps unconsciously, obscured his dehumanising and post-political approach to life by 
transplanting it into Human Rights discourse.  
By way of example, Besson described Human Rights as ‘a sub-set of universal moral rights (i) 
that protect fundamental and general interests (ii) against the intervention, or in some cases non-
intervention, of (national, regional or international) public institutions (iii)’. 149  Later on, Besson 
enlarged the extent of the relationship between morality and law and, building on Raz, claimed that 
legal rights ‘are moral interests recognised by the law as sufficiently important to generate moral 
duties’.150 Legal Human Rights serve the same function, as they ‘are fundamental and general moral 
interests recognised by the law as sufficiently important to generate moral duties’. Yet these two 
categories are autonomous: ‘moral rights can exist independently from legal rights’ and some legal 
rights ‘may not actually protect pre-existing moral rights or create moral rights’. In this case, they are 
‘legal duties at the most’.151 Besson’s taxonomical approach is, however, merely notional because 
‘respect for universal moral [i.e., not just human] rights ought to be voluntary in priority . . . 
independently from any institutional involvement.152 
While Besson’s use of the term ‘voluntary’ seems to suggest that what is at stake here is the 
subject’s self-defining (i.e., active) comportment, the Kantian (i.e., behavioural) principle that informs 
her normative rationalism is evident. Notably, Kant promoted an idea of moral conduct that ‘tells the 
agent to subordinate the will to the universal perspective of reason itself’.153 As acutely noted by Arendt, 
not only is morality excluded from Kant’s precept154 (as it is in Besson’s narrow notion of ‘legal 
duties’), but Kant’s strategy targets what constitutes our uniqueness: the humanising conflict that takes 
place within the will between velle and nolle. 155 Hence Kant used his categorical imperative to dream 
of a contractarian, totalising, perpetual common-wealth of peace and contemplation in which economic 
security is provided by the fact that ‘[t]he subject is now to give to himself the principle of his own 
being: reason’.156 Yet, as Arendt taught us, the ultimate basis of human (civil) rights is political action, 
and political action cannot be built on contemplation. This is why the regulative belief that underpins 
Kantian ethics has turned out to be one of the main components of the notions of ‘civilised economy’, 
‘good economic governance’, and, through them, our behavioural animalisation. The post-historical and 
post-political essence of both the civilising mission of contract and modern constitutional project are 
indeed in line with neo-Kantian forms of social analysis, such as that of von Kempski, according to 
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whom all social sciences, including jurisprudence, can be explained through the dehumanised 
behavioural schemes offered by mathematical economics.  
This is also demonstrated by the way in which the Kantian metaphysical principle that defines 
what is ‘right’ is structurally related to a peculiar universalist conception of one of (contract) law’s key 
elements, that of ‘legal duty’, which also figures in Besson’s reflections. Building on  Schopenhauer 
and Heidegger, Agamben has shown, I think successfully, that ‘Kant represents the moment when the 
[Western] ontology of command and having-to-be reaches its most extreme elaboration and, by 
penetrating into the ontology of substance and being, seeks to transform it from within’.157 This is so 
because, in describing ‘the nature of the command and duty stemming from the law in terms of an 
external constraint[, Kant] transfers this definition to morality in the form of autoconstraint 
(Selbstzwang)’.158 Thus Kant developed an ‘ontology of operativity’ in which ‘being and acting are 
indeterminated and contracted onto one another, and being becomes something that does not simply 
exist, but has to be brought about’.159 Agamben concedes that ‘the command  . . .  presupposes a will’.160 
However, from the perspective of the ruled, the humanising properties of action are replaced by Kant’s 
practical reason.161 The paradox of Kantian autoconstraint is thus clear: it is ‘an objective command 
which assumes the form of a subjective impulse (Triebfeder)’.162  
 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
We can now attempt to overlap the Kantian ontology of duty with the self-defining component of the 
legal ideology of contract discussed earlier that, by placing the parties on a moral-political, and thus 
equally humanising, platform of interaction, tries to counter the modern constitutional ideal as well as 
the global paradigms of ‘civilised economy’ and ‘good economic governance.’ 
As the influence of constitutional values and Fundamental Rights policies on Contract law’s 
mechanisms and settings that this book has addressed indicates, the contract is gradually becoming the 
‘political community of equals’163 to which Besson refers when explaining how the law makes universal 
moral rights ‘Human Rights strictu sensu’.164 In light of the foregoing discussion, it seems difficult to 
                                                          
157 Agamben (2013), p. 121. See also Agamben (2013); Agamben (2011).  
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159 Ibid., p. 118.  
160 Ibid., p. 129. 
161 See Caputo (2001), pp. 42–43: what we are standing before here is the ‘“thinking thing” fully in charge of its 
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dispute that the intensification in the use of contractual good faith is a pivotal component of this 
phenomenon, and, in particular, of the constitutionalisation of Contract law.  
Some commentators would probably deem this suggestion to be misleading and/or mystifying. 
In particular, they might point to the illusory essence of consensualism because ‘[a]lthough contract 
purports to replace or supplement the obligations of public law with “private law”, every such attempt 
is subject to judicial review’.165 The same might be said regarding the ex-post requirements with which 
the parties may be required to comply to secure, say, the passage of property rights. Both contentions 
would certainly be appropriate. However, paraphrasing Heidegger with the due caution,166 we may say 
that the ‘temporal determinateness’ 167  of the contr-act is expressed by the parties’ ‘anticipatory 
resoluteness’.168 Consequently, what happens after the parties finalise the agreement through action and 
deed does not alter the fact that, while at the public level the Kantian imperative has a self-dissolving, 
captivating effect, 169  the performative essence of the parties’ faithful relationship transforms the 
contract into a political space of appearance for each of them. In other words, the contr-act ‘deactivates 
the very excess of signification’ of the Kantian subjectless categorical imperative. If the ‘only 
foundation of man is . . . his own action, his own giving himself grounds’,170 the p-act-um becomes a 
‘mark of factical experience’, that is, the uncovering signature of the parties’ self-conscious projection 
and re-flexion.  
To comprehend the legal dimension of this process fully, we should bear in mind why Agamben 
is also of the opinion that Kant’s ontology of operativity and command found its greatest expression in 
                                                          
165 Joo (2013), p. 64. 
166 The use of Heidegger at this stage of our inquiry requires prudence because of his commitment to fighting the 
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in 1953, is in line with that which he expounded in Being and Time, published in 1927. His admiration for Paul, 
the founder of the faculty of the will, is therefore less surprising than it might first appear. 
167 Heidegger (2008), pp. 163, 175, 232 and 238–39. See also ibid. pp. 40, 237, 386, and 470. Agamben has 
recently contended that ‘[t]o the primacy [that Heidegger confers on] care over use corresponds, in the second 
division of [Being and Time], the primacy of temporality over spatiality’. If that is the case, it would prove 
worthwhile to ascertain whether the contractual notion of good faith shares some elements—and if so, which ones, 
why, and to what extent—with Heidegger’s conception of care as ‘the fundamental structure of Dasein’. See 
Agamben (2016), pp. 43 and 38 respectively. 
168 Heidegger (2008), pp. 372, 236, and 386. 
169 ‘Kant’s blindness’, Agamben writes, ‘is not to have seen that, in the society that was arising with the industrial 
revolution, in which human beings had been subjected to forces that they could not in any way control, the morality 
of duty would habituate them to consider obedience to a command . . . an act of freedom’. See Agamben (2013), 
p. 123. 
170 Agamben (1999a), p. 135. 
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Kelsen’s pure theory of (Public) law and notion of sovereignty—that is, in the positivistic conception 
that sees ‘[t]he relationship between norm and behaviour . . . not [as] a relation of being but a relation 
of having-to-be’.171 The term ‘behaviour’, I contend, is obviously not casual, because what takes place 
in Kelsen’s juridification of the Kantian regulative paradigm is the displacement of the subject’s free 
‘action’ as informed by the internal conflict from which the sovereign choice between velle and nolle 
arises. What is neglected by Kelsen is thus the sovereignty of the will to perform the self-understanding 
of humans’ uniqueness through the affirmation or negation of a future project, as it is in Hobbes.172 This 
is why Caputo writes that ‘Kant is the Chief of Police’ who ‘always tell[s] us what is possible and what 
is not [by] laying down the conditions of the possibility of this or that’.173 That Kantian philosophy is 
ahistorical and apolitical174 is thus proved by the fact that this sort of coercion does not require the 
personality of those who are subject to it.175 Consequently, while Kelsen’s Kantian-oriented ‘legal 
ought’ is the expression of a ‘depsychologized will’176 similar to that which Hobbes places at the centre 
of his post-political construct, the emphasis on contractual good faith that has recently emerged in 
Common law countries replaces the self-defining properties of action back on stage.  
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